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1 Introduction
For more than a decade, discussions of U.S. monetary policy have been organized
around variants of the benchmark description advanced by Taylor (1993),
rt = ρ¯+ π¯ + c2(πt − π¯) + c3(yt − y¯t) + ǫr,t, (1)
where r denotes the short-term policy rate controlled by the central bank; ρ¯ is the
natural rate of the real interest rate; π − π¯ measures the gap between inflation and
the central bank target for inflation; and y − y¯ is the log output gap. Although
this description was initially based on data from 1987-1992, a period that includes
the initial five years of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)1 decisions under
the Greenspan tenure, variations have been applied to the behavior of many other
central banks and to the historical behavior of the FOMC.2
To rationalize the behavior of monetary policy in the 1970s and understand
its role in causing the Great Inflation, empirical studies have investigated
modifications to one or more arguments of equation (1). However, when evaluating
such variations within the framework of a theoretical model, it is important to
recognize that alternative calibrations of policy could support a large number
of possible policy variations in the 1970s. Assuming equation (1) provides an
adequate characterization of the responses of postwar U.S. monetary policy, then
the three natural rates (of output, y¯t, inflation, π¯, and the real interest rate, ρ¯)
and two parameters of this equation fully describe the determinants of policy.
If combinations of variations in the five arguments are considered, alternative
calibrations of equation (1) could support 31 possible theories of policy failure
during the Great Inflation.3 The number of theories of monetary policy sources
of the Great Inflation would be larger still if equation (1) is generalized to include
other macroeconomic variables that may have influenced settings of the federal
funds rate historically.
This paper explores a data-based explanation of U.S. policy to evaluate the
relative merits of alternative theories of the Great Inflation. By estimating
1The FOMC is responsible for the actions of U.S. monetary policy through open market operations.
2A sizeable literature explores regression estimates of U.S. policy responses over postwar samples, including Judd
and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor (1999), Romer and Romer (2002), and Nelson (2005).
3The number of combinations is calculated as
5∑
i=1
(
5!
i!(5−i)!
)
= 31. Inconclusive calibration exercises of two
competing theories of the Great Inflation are discussed in Collard and Dellas (2004). Surveys of alternative
interpretations of U.S. inflation in the 1970s include Velde (2004) and Nelson (2005). Various interpretations were
explored in presentations at the NBER’s “The Great Inflation Conference” in September 2008.
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time-varying response coefficients and natural rates, the analysis encompasses
most of the alternative variations typically considered in isolation in theoretical
formulations as well as most previous empirical studies. One particularly
important difference from earlier evaluations of policy responses is that the FOMC
inflation target is not assumed to be a known constant, and the estimated responses
imply a time-varying effective FOMC inflation target. In addition, in contrast to
many earlier empirical studies, real-time FOMC briefing forecasts of inflation and
the unemployment rate are used to ensure that policy is being conditioned on a
view of the economy that is consistent with the data as it was available at the time,
and with a view of the outlook as prepared by Federal Reserve Board staff.
In a departure from most Taylor-rule based studies of historical monetary policy,
the analysis of this paper is extended explicitly to encompass a monetarist strategy
of intermediate money growth targeting. Intermediate targeting of monetary
aggregates dominated FOMC policy in the 1970s, and empirical results for
the tenures of Arthur Burns and G. William Miller as chairmen of the FOMC
(February 1970 through July 1979) are consistent with such a policy.
Surprisingly, previous interpretations of the U.S. Great Inflation do not explore
possible consequences of intermediate targeting of M1 growth in the 1970s. One
reason may be that money growth targeting did not appear to be a formal objective
of U.S. monetary policy until growth rate targets were published by the FOMC
in May 1975, in response to the House Concurrent Resolution 133 request for
disclosure of annual objectives for money aggregates at Congressional hearings.
Indeed, as Milton Friedman (1982) indicated: “The unpegging of government bond
prices in 1953 was followed by lip service by the Federal Reserve to monetary
growth as a long-run target. However, to the best of my knowledge, it did not
set any specific monetary growth targets for itself until 1975, when Congress
required it to do so.” However, formal, but unpublished, targets for monetary
aggregates were adopted by the FOMC beginning in February 1970, vid. Table
1. Moreover, increased emphasis on control of the monetary aggregates has been
noted by DeRosa and Stern (1977), who also provide empirical evidence of a clear
change in the Federal Reserve System’s operating procedure in 1970.
A Taylor-like specification is used in section 2 to estimate the response of the
Federal funds rate to FOMC briefing forecasts of inflation and the unemployment
rate from 1970 through 1979. Estimated policy responses for the tenures of
Arthur Burns and G. William Miller, chairmen of the FOMC from February 1970
through July 1979, are contrasted with those of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan,
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chairmen during the sample August 1979 through December 1997. Section 3
explores restrictions on the policy rate responses in the 1970s that are consistent
with intermediate targeting of money growth rates.
Of course, adopting M1 targets does not automatically imply that the targets
will be met, and Broaddus and Goodfriend (1984) document that M1 growth fell
outside the published target ranges half of the time in the last half of the 1970s
and by a higher proportion during the Volcker disinflation in the 1980s. Section
4 uses extracts from the FOMC Memorandum of Discussion (MOD) to indicate
FOMC participants repeatedly endorsed money growth intermediate targeting but
also, from time to time, identified several practices that plausibly undermined the
intermediate targeting procedures, such as optimistic estimates of responses to
policy rate adjustments.
Moreover, as observed by Schmid (1999), “the success of monetary policy is
measured not in terms of the intermediate target but in terms of the final goal.” In
forward-looking macro models, long-term inflation expectations are anchored by
private sector perceptions of the central bank inflation target, Woodford (2008).
An additional characteristic of the US experience with intermediate targeting,
shown in section 3, is that perceptions of long-term US inflation continued to
rise throughout the 1970s despite the switch to intermediate targeting. Section
4 indicates how the effective inflation target in the 1970s under money growth
targeting exceeded ex ante inflation goals consistent with the FOMC money growth
targets, due to sizeable unexpected shocks to money velocity and trend output.
In the absence of an announced inflation target to anchor longer-run inflation
expectations, private sector perceptions of inflation targets have been shown to
approach the effective inflation target of the central bank with lags that depend on
the learning models of the private sector. The estimated learning models in Kozicki
and Tinsley (2001ab) are based on changes in the estimated mean of inflation, and
the learning model in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) is based on filtering predicted
responses of the central bank policy rate.
An additional consequence of intermediate targeting, summarized briefly in
section 5, is that US intermediate targeting of aggregate money growth rates in the
1970s proved to be a distraction from objective performance measures of ultimate
goals, such as longer-run inflation. By contrast, attention to longer-run inflation
expectations appears to have helped achieve more successful inflation outcomes
in Germany in the late 1970s and, subsequently, in the US under Volcker. As
money growth target ranges were missed with about the same frequency in the
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US and Germany, two indicators of longer-term inflation expectations in Germany
suggest the better performance of German inflation in the 1970s may be due to the
announced inflation objective of the Bundesbank. Section 6 concludes.
2 Funds rate responses to real-time forecasts.
In the spirit of several retrospective studies of historical U.S. monetary policy,
cited in the introduction, this section provides estimates of responses of the Federal
funds rate to real-time predictions of inflation and unemployment, obtained from
briefing materials presented to the FOMC.
2.1 A framework for estimating policy rate responses
In the absence of policy rate smoothing, the desired setting of the federal funds
rate at the FOMC meeting in period tf is the forward-looking specification
r∗tf = ρ¯t + π¯t + c2,t(π
4
t+1|tg
− π¯t) + c3,t(ut+1|tg − u¯t) + c4,t∆ut|tg, (2)
where tf denotes the date of an FOMC meeting contained in quarter t. As in
equation (1), ρ¯ denotes the natural rate for the real policy rate and π¯ is the
central bank inflation target, except here both may vary over time. Note also
that estimation may allow for time-varying responses, such as the response to
inflation, c2,t. As the subscript notation indicates, variation in coefficient responses
is assumed to change only at quarterly intervals.4
Right-hand-side forecast variables in (2) are drawn from the Greenbook
multiperiod forecast, formulated in tg < tf , presented at the FOMC meeting in
tf . As discussed in Kozicki and Tinsley (2006), the frequency of FOMC meetings
and Greenbooks was monthly through much of the 1970s but has remained at 8
meetings per year since 1981.5 Thus, ut+1|tg is the Greenbook forecast of the
unemployment rate in the next quarter of the forecast horizon. The inflation
4This is achieved by stacking observations for all FOMC meetings in a given quarter in vectors, see discussions in
Kozicki and Tinsley (2006, 2007). In other words, rather than select a subset of Greenbooks (GB) to obtain a quarterly
data set, the full set of real-time, multiperiod GB forecasts that match the frequency of meeting-to-meeting funds rate
averages is incorporated in a state space model. By contrast, if policy responses were to vary at each FOMC meeting,
the coefficient response would be denoted by c2,tf .
5The Greenbook is a staff briefing document presented to FOMC members before a policy meeting of the FOMC.
Part I presents the staff multiperiod forecast of economic activity. Construction of the modal forecast and the roles of
sectoral specialists and senior staff are discussed in Kalchbrenner and Tinsley (1977) and Kozicki and Tinsley (2006).
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measure, π4t+1|tg , is a four-quarter average of inflation up to the next quarter t+1 in
the forecast horizon, recalling that the FOMC meeting is contained in the current
quarter, t. Consequently, real-time estimates of activity in the current quarter and
any required preceding quarters, t − i, also are drawn from the staff Greenbook
“forecast” in tg.
In contrast to use of the output gap in (1), variation of real activity in (2)
is captured by the deviation of the unemployment rate from its natural rate,
u¯. As noted in Kozicki and Tinsley (2006), FOMC discussions in the 1970s
and 1980s of the utilization rate of real economic resources was more typically
discussed in terms of unemployment rates. The measure for u¯t is the real-time
time-varying estimate of the natural rate of unemployment constructed from
Greenbook forecasts in Kozicki and Tinsley (2006).6.
To nest the possibility that FOMC policies may have placed a greater emphasis
on the change in activity, as suggested by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Lansing
(2002), the desired policy rate may also be a function of the projected change in
the unemployment rate, ∆ut|tg.
The natural rate of the real policy rate, ρ¯t, is measured as an HP filter of the
historical funds rate less the Greenbook forecast of inflation, r − π.7 The average
of the natural rate construction is 2.6 over the full sample, with ρ¯t falling below the
average value in the mid-1970s and rising above the average in the first half of the
1980s.
Dynamic adjustments of the funds rate are represented by
rtf = β5,t∆rtf−1 + (1− β6,t)r
∗
tf
+ β6,trtf−1 + atf , (3)
where rtf denotes the average funds rate in the interval after the FOMC meeting
in tf until the next FOMC meeting. Right-hand-side regressors in (3) include a
term capturing any continuation of the most recent meeting-to-meeting change in
the funds rate; a partial adjustment of the funds rate level to the desired current
setting; and an i.i.d. stochastic shock, atf .8
6The estimation methodology is also discussed in the appendix of Kozicki and Tinsley (2007)
7Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), the Hodrick-Prescott smoothing parameter is 24 x 1600 = 25, 600, as the
FOMC has met at least eight times a year during the sample used.
8As indicated by the subscript notation, the state space “measurement” error, atf , varies with the
meeting-to-meeting average of the funds rate.
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Combining equations (2) and (3) gives
rtf = β1,t + β2,tπ
4
t+1|tg
+ β3,t(ut+1|tg − u¯t) + β4,t∆ut|tg
+β5,t∆rtf−1 + β6,t(rtf−1 − ρ¯t) + ρ¯t + atf . (4)
In summary, as shown also in Table 2, the funds rates are meeting-to-meeting
averages and denoted by the subscript tf . The explanatory variables, such as
ut+1|tg, are drawn from the Greenbook forecast prepared in tg for the FOMC
meeting tf , where tg < tf .
Given the real-time Greenbook forecasts and estimates of the natural rates, u¯t
and ρ¯t, the policy response equation implies an effective central bank target for
inflation
π¯t = −β1,t/(β2,t + β6,t − 1), (5)
which is obtained by mapping the reduced-form parameters in (4) to the structural
parameters and unobserved inflation target in expressions (2) and (3).
The effective inflation target construction of (5) may not necessarily correspond
to inflation objectives in the collective minds of FOMC members but is implied by
the interpretation of variations in historical policy rates provided by equations (2)
and (3). As an inflation target was not announced by the FOMC, (5) could be a
reasonable inference by historical observers of movements in the funds rate, if they
had had access to the same forecast information and assumptions as the FOMC.9
2.2 Estimated policy rate responses
Estimated coefficients of the policy response equation, (4), are presented below
for two time varying parameter (TVP) specifications. The random walk intercept
(RWI) specification allows the intercept term to evolve according to a unit root
process, but other coefficients are restricted to be constant. Alternatively, in the
stationary coefficients (SC) specification, all coefficients of the policy response
equation are allowed to be time-varying, with variation captured by stationary
autoregressive movements about fixed means. Use of real-time, multiperiod GB
9Distinctions between central bank targets and perceptions of targets by uninformed observers are explored in
Kozicki and Tinsley (2001ab, 2005). Differences in assumptions about the natural rate estimates, u¯t and ρ¯t, can alter
the estimate of the effective inflation target. Orphanides (2003, 2004) and others, for example, suggest the main failure
of 1970s policy was a severe overestimation of trend output or underestimation of the natural rate of unemployment. By
contrast, Kozicki and Tinsley (2006) indicate implied Greenbook underestimates of the natural rate of unemployment,
as gauged by CBO retrospective estimates, were modest and confined to the early 1970s.
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forecasts in a state space model and TVP estimation methods are discussed in
Kozicki and Tinsley (2006).
Summary statistics are shown in Table 3 for two samples. The means of the
coefficients, the maximum and minimum of the implied inflation targets, and a
steady-state variance decomposition provide summary contrasts among alternative
specifications.
The bottom panel of Table 3 displays the estimated FOMC policy responses for
the sample August 1979 through December 1997. This sample, which includes
tenures of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan as chairmen of the FOMC, spans
152 Greenbooks over 74 quarters. The TVP specifications include also shifts in
the variance of the measurement error, σ2a, to account for the change in operating
procedures from 1979Q4 to 1982Q3.10
In the four-quarter inflation regressor, π4t+1|tg , inflation forecasts are averaged
over the first two quarters of the Greenbook forecast horizon and the two preceding
quarters.11
The estimated mean policy responses to all regressors, β¯i,t, including the
forecast unemployment gap, ut+1|tg − u¯t, are generally statistically significant in
the bottom panel of Table 3. The time-varying estimate of the long-run policy
response to inflation, c2,t, remains above one throughout the sample, although it
falls somewhat in the 1990s for the SC specification. Also, as noted in the last two
columns, the effective inflation target in the Volcker/Greenspan sample is estimated
to be 3-4 percent.
The top panel of Table 3 estimates FOMC policy responses for the sample
February 1970 through July 1979. This sample spans 115 Greenbooks over 39
quarters and encompasses the tenures of Arthur Burns and G. William Miller as
chairmen of the FOMC. There are two principal differences from the estimated
policy responses in the bottom panel.
First, the mean responses to inflation in the Burns/Miller sample, as measured
by β¯2, are about half the size of the responses estimated for the Volcker/Greenspan
sample. Given that the mean responses to the lagged funds rate, β¯6, are only
10The use of a nonborrowed reserves instrument during the 1979-82 interval increased the effective variance of atf
by introducing shocks from money demand and the banking reserves market, vid.Tinsley, von zur Muehlen, and Fries
(1982).
11Although longer Greenbook forecast horizons are available in the Volcker/Greenspan sample, estimates are
relatively unaffected if the four-quarter inflation average is shifted ahead by two quarters, pi4t+3|tg . Also, a likelihood
ratio suggests a slight advantage for the specification that contains both forward forecasts and backward real-time
estimates, pi4
t+1|tg
.
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slightly larger, this suggests that the mean long-run response to inflation, c¯2,
is much smaller than the mean inflation response in the later sample. Indeed,
the estimated time-varying response to inflation, c2,t, falls below unity in the
mid-1970s. When that occurs, the estimated inflation target constructed by (5)
is generally negative, as confirmed by the inflation target range shown in the last
two columns of the top panel of Table 3.
Second, and more consequential to the current interpretation of policy, the
mean response to the forecast unemployment gap, β¯3, is not significantly different
from zero under either the random walk intercept (RWI) or stationary coefficient
(SC) specifications. This suggests that interpretations of 1970s policy based on
erroneous estimates of the natural rate of real activity may be largely irrelevant.12
By contrast, the mean response to the forecast change in the unemployment rate,
β¯4, is statistically significant and about twice (in absolute value) the estimated
mean response to inflation, β¯2. Implications of this result are explored in the next
section.
3 An alternative interpretation of policy in the 1970s
As noted in the introduction, simple policy response equations that relate
movements of the policy interest rate, r, to changes in arguments of the central
bank preference function, such as inflation and measures of natural rate gaps,
are the basis of many useful empirical descriptions of historical monetary policy.
However, positing a direct link between the policy instrument and ultimate policy
objectives conceals a major component of the design of monetary policy in the
1970s. This section indicates that intermediate targeting of monetary aggregates–a
monetarist strategy that dominated FOMC policy in the 1970s–provides a unified
interpretation of the Great Inflation, explaining the irrelevance of the natural rate
gap regressor and providing a more historically accurate description of policy
design in the 1970s.
12The absence of a policy response to unemployment gaps also casts doubt on interpretations of 1970s policy based
on a difference between the natural rate of unemployment and a central bank target for unemployment, such as posited
in the time-inconsistency literature.
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3.1 The gathering influence of monetarism on US monetary policy
In a collection of influential essays, Milton Friedman (1960) indicated that “I share
the doubts that the Federal Reserve has repeatedly expressed about the desirability
of using price level stability as an intermediate guide to policy.” Instead, he
proposed that the central bank pursue constant growth of the money stock. In
1960, a unified measure of the money supply was published in the October
Federal Reserve Bulletin. In the June 1966 FOMC meeting, the FOMC Policy
Directive to the trading desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York contained
the first “proviso” reference to the required reserves aggregate as a secondary
target. Finally, in the second FOMC meeting chaired by Arthur Burns, the Policy
Directive adopted at the March 10, 1970 meeting selected the growth of monetary
aggregates as principal targets of US monetary policy.
Policy forecasting and FOMC policy discussions in the 1970s were shaped by
the two-stage design that is characteristic of intermediate targeting. Greenbook
forecasts of economic activity were conditioned on the assumption of a trajectory
for the money supply over the forecast horizon, vid. Kalchbrenner and Tinsley
(1977).13 To assist sectoral specialists, the senior staff translated the money supply
assumption into staff expectations of bond yields over the forecast horizon.
By contrast, short-run policy options were formulated as competing money
growth paths associated with alternative settings of the policy instrument, usually
the nominal Federal funds rate. In principle, the competing options for the
money supply represented different short-run paths toward the baseline money
supply trajectory assumed in the Greenbook. These short-run policy options
were presented in a briefing document known as the Bluebook. Each Bluebook
contained a brief summary of recent activity in money and banking markets
and suggested, generally, three policy options for discussion by the FOMC.14
Forecasts of money growth associated with alternative policy rate settings appear
in the Bluebook presented at the first FOMC meeting chaired by Arthur Burns
13Generally, the monetary policy assumption of the Greenbook forecast was the M1 growth rate target selected at
the last FOMC meeting. For example: “That growth rate of money (4%) had been assumed for projection purposes
because the Committee had been employing such a rate as a target over the past several months.” Partee, FOMC
Economist (MOD, 6/23/70, p.31).
14An example of staff interpretations of the Bluebook policy options: “Mr. Axilrod observed that among the
alternative sets of relationships between monetary aggregates and money market conditions presented in each blue
book, there was always one that represented a continuation of the Committee’s current longer-run target for the
aggregates. There was always another alternative that represented a continuation of prevailing money market
conditions.” (MOD, 11/20/72, p.52). “Money market conditions” is FOMC terminology for the Federal funds rate.
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on February 10, 1970. Although alternative forecasts of the money supply were
initially limited to the current quarter, as in the February 4 Bluebook, or also
included the next quarter ahead, as in the March 4 Bluebook, Bluebook conditional
money supply forecasts were eventually lengthened to four-quarter horizons in
early 1975. Table 1 lists the unpublished FOMC targets for M1 growth, from
the first FOMC meeting chaired by Arthur Burns through the last FOMC meeting
before publication of M1 targets in May 1975.15
3.2 Empirical evidence for intermediate targeting in the Burns/Miller era
Intermediate targeting of the money supply is summarized by three equations,
∆mt = πt +∆yt −∆vt, (6)
∆m¯t = π¯t +∆y¯t −∆v¯t, (7)
r∗tf = ρ¯t + π¯t + c2,t(∆mt −∆m¯t + (∆vt −∆v¯t)), (8)
where equation (6) is the monetarist equation of exchange that links Greenbook
forecasts of inflation and output growth to the projected growth of the monetary
aggregate. Equation (7) is a natural rate variant that indicates what target growth
of the monetary aggregate is consistent with the inflation target and the natural rate
for output growth. The desired setting of the funds rate at the FOMC meeting in
period tf is defined by equation (8). This is an adjusted variant of intermediate
targeting, where monetary aggregate growth is adjusted for the staff prediction of
transient velocity growth, ∆vt −∆v¯t.16
Substituting the first two equations, (6) and (7), into the third equation (8), gives
the desired funds rate explicitly conditioned on averages of Greenbook forecasts,
r∗tf = ρ¯t + π¯t + c2,t((π
4
t+1 − π¯t) + (∆y
4
t+1 −∆y¯t)),
= ρ¯t + π¯t + c2,t∆xt+1|tg, (9)
15Short-run monitoring or “tolerance” ranges were also specified for a variety of measures, including the funds rate,
growth in reserves, and growth in money and credit aggregates.
16By construction, a persistent shift in trend velocity alters the natural rate estimate, ∆v¯t. “Shift-adjusted”’ monetary
aggregate targets, to account for the estimated effects of financial innovations such as the nationwide introduction
of negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, were not publicly announced until 1981. The transient velocity
adjustment,∆vt−∆v¯t, of equation (8) approximates the “zone of indifference” or short-run tolerance ranges the FOMC
adopted in the 1970s to accommodate transient movements within growth rate target ranges. An early interpretation
of the “zone of indifference” is: “Chairman Burns remarked at the last meeting he had initially defined the (short-run)
ranges for the aggregates as zones of no action. He had then modified that—in response to Mr. Holmes’ remarks—to
provide for a movement in the funds rate of up to but no more than 1/8 of 1 percentage point as the aggregates
approached their limits. In the event that the aggregates appeared to be moving beyond their limits, however, full and
free use was to be made of the range for the funds rate.” (MOD, 11/20/72 p. 50).
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where ∆xt+1|tg is a proxy for the nominal output growth gap using Okun’s Law,
∆xt+1|tg = π
4
t+1|tg
− π¯t−a
′∆u4t+1|tg and, as previously, z
4
t+1|tg
denotes a Greenbook
forecast in tg of a four-quarter average ending in the next quarter of the forecast
horizon, t+ 1.
Note that equation (9) is a restricted version of the desired funds rate equation
specified earlier in (2). Three restrictions are required by money growth
intermediate targeting: First, the policy response to the unemployment gap is
zero, c3,t = 0. Second, the difference in the unemployment rate, ∆u4t+1|tg, is
averaged over the same number of periods as the inflation rate regressor. Third, the
long-run policy responses to the inflation average, π4t+1|tg , and to the average of the
unemployment rate difference proxy, −a′∆u4t+1|tg, are the same, c2,t. The dynamic
adjustment of the funds rate is the same as that specified earlier in equation (3).
Three sets of estimates of the policy response equation implied by money
growth intermediate targeting are presented in Table 4. The Okun’s Law coefficient
is based on estimates for the 1970s in Tatom (1978), a′ = 2.2. Equations in the
bottom panel of Table 4 are estimates of the policy response equation when all
three restrictions associated with intermediate targeting of the money growth are
imposed. The unemployment gap regressor, ut+1|tg − u¯t, is added to equations
in the top panel of Table 4. Similar to the results in Table 3, the estimated mean
policy responses to the unemployment gap, β¯3, are statistically insignificant. In
addition, the average difference in the unemployment rate, ∆u4t+1|tg, is added to the
equations reported in the middle panel of Table 4. These equations also indicate
that the mean policy response of the Burns/Miller sample to the difference in the
unemployment rate does not differ significantly from the response expected under
money growth intermediate targeting.
Although not shown, the estimated long-run policy responses, c2,t, to the
nominal-growth proxies, ∆xt+1|tg, implied by the TVP specifications in the bottom
panel of Table 4 move between 0.5 and 0.7 during the 1970s. Thus, the implied
long-run responses to inflation are even further below one than those estimated in
section 2 for the Burns/Miller sample.
The effective inflation target is estimated to lie between 6.1 and 7.2 percent,
and about 6.8 percent on average for the SC specification. Other studies have
obtained comparable results, using a variety of approaches, but limiting analysis
to available retrospective data rather than real-time Greenbook data. In a two-state
Markov-switching set-up, Dueker and Fischer (1996) estimated that the implicit
inflation target in the 1970s was on the order of 6 percent. To the extent that low
11
frequency movements in inflation reflect the effective inflation target, results are
also consistent with those obtained by Cogley and Sargent (2005), who, in a VAR
with drifting coefficients and stochastic volatilities, estimated that “core inflation”
in the 1970s was roughly in a range of 5 to 8 percent.
In the absence of an announced central bank target for inflation, private
sector perceptions of the central bank target will approach the effective target
with lags that depend on the learning models of the private sector, such as the
inflation-based learning models estimated in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001ab) and the
funds rate-based learning model in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005).
Differences between the effective central bank target for inflation implied by
Greenbook forecasts, π¯t, and estimates of private sector perceptions of the central
bank inflation target, π¯pt , are charted in Fig. 1. The two thick lines are estimates
of the effective inflation target, π¯t, for the Burns/Miller era from 1970Q1 through
1979Q2 (from the bottom panel of Table 4), and for the Volcker/Greenspan sample
from 1979Q3 through 1997Q4 (from the bottom panel of Table 3). The thick
dashed line is a concatenation of real-time survey estimates of long-term inflation
expectations by private agents.17 The thin line is an estimate of the evolution of
private sector perceptions of the central bank target for inflation, π¯pt , from Kozicki
and Tinsley (2001a).18
Fig. 1 suggests that at the beginning of the 1970s, the central bank benefited
from private sector perceptions, π¯pt , that provided a low anchor for inflation
expectations relative to the effective target for inflation, π¯t. Thus, despite policy
actions consistent with an elevated inflation target, the rise in inflation may have
been moderated by this anchor. However, in the absence of improvements in actual
inflation (as shown by the central tendency of inflation, represented in the chart by
the HP filter of real-time inflation), private sector perceptions continued to increase
toward the effective target, and this moderating factor gradually evaporated. In the
1980s, the situation was largely reversed. The effective inflation target was lowered
considerably with the change in policy instituted by Volcker in October 1979, but
17Until July 1990, survey estimates are drawn from the Hoey survey of expected inflation in the second five years of
a 10-year forecast horizon. The remainder of the series is long-run expected inflation from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
18This estimate is based on multinomial logit aggregation of competing changepoint estimators of p¯it. Although this
estimate of perceived long-run inflation is similar to the survey of long-term expected inflation, survey information was
not used in the estimated learning model of private sector perceptions. As discussed in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001ab),
in the case of changepoints, inflation can be nonstationary but not necessarily I(1), and the limit of an infinite-horizon
forecast, limj→∞Etpit+j = p¯ipt , is not always equivalent to a Beveridge-Nelson trend component.
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private sector perceptions of the central bank target for inflation remained elevated
in the early 1980s, despite the rapid fall in inflation (and the HP inflation “trend”).
At the beginning of the 1980s, the credibility gap between the effective target and
the perceived target was about five percentage points, and this gap only slowly
closed by the end of the sample.
4 Consequences of money growth intermediate targeting
The most striking outcomes of the TVP specifications of policy in the 1970s are the
rather high estimates of the central bank effective target for inflation, π¯t, and the
uniformly low estimates of the long-run policy responses to inflation, c2,t, noted
earlier. Intermediate money growth targeting provides a unified explanation of
these two characteristics of policy given the observed shocks in the 1970s.
First, when monetary policy targets the growth rate of the money supply, the
effective inflation target is vulnerable to two types of fundamental shocks, both
of which occurred in the 1970s. Renormalizing equation (7), the effective central
bank target for inflation under intermediate targeting is defined by
π¯t = ∆m¯t −∆y¯t +∆v¯t. (10)
Given a target growth rate for the money supply, ∆m¯t, the effective inflation target
will exceed the ex ante inflation goal consistent with the original money growth
target if the central bank is unable to detect a reduction in the natural rate trend
growth of output, ∆y¯t, or an increase in trend velocity, ∆v¯t. In fact, both these
shocks were a feature of the policy environment in the 1970s. Growth of the natural
rate output trend slowed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Subsequently, due to
financial innovations fuelled by higher inflation and deregulation of banking and
financial markets, the trend of velocity began a long march of upward shifts in the
mid-1970s.
A literature review of estimated shifts in US trend productivity is provided
in Bullard and Duffy (2004). Real-time estimates of trend productivity growth
from 1970-2005 are discussed in Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2007), including
available historical estimates from the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). The
latter’s estimate of trend productivity fell by about 1.3 percentage points over the
1970s. Real-time errors in the CEA estimates of trend productivity have also been
used to support a “natural rate error” interpretation of the 1970s, except money
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growth targeting is vulnerable to errors in trend growth rather than the associated
cumulative errors in the output gap.
Larger errors were associated with predictions of trend velocity, and these
errors are unique to a policy based on money supply intermediate targeting.
In the 1970s, the unpredicted shifts in trend velocity were substantial. The
December 12, 1980 Bluebook contains an analysis of money demand models.
Conditioned on retrospective measurements of explanatory variables, the average
annual underestimate of velocity growth over the last half of the 1970s by the
1980 vintage of the staff model was 2.7 percentage points, including errors of 5.3
percentage points in 1975 and 4.1 percentage points in 1976.19
The second unusual characteristic of policy in the 1970s is that the estimated
long-run policy response to the money supply growth proxy, c2,t, remained well
below one in the Burns/Miller sample. As shown in Fig. 2, FOMC decisions led to
flat or modest meeting-to-meeting adjustments of the policy rate level after 1974,
until the large upward adjustments of the policy rate in the initial FOMC meetings
chaired by Paul Volcker after October 1979 (not shown).
The passivity of policy through much of the second-half of the 1970s is
also illustrated in Fig. 3, where the policy rate is plotted against the Greenbook
prediction of the nominal growth proxy, ∆xt+1, defined earlier. Even if velocity
had been perfectly predicted, variations of the funds rate did not keep pace with
Greenbook predicted movements of nominal growth during most of the 1970s.
Passivity of policy needs to be differentiated from contemporaneous critiques of
money growth targeting in the 1970s that included criticism of the relatively narrow
FOMC ranges on inter-meeting variations of the policy rate, vid. Poole (1975).
Clearly, as shown in Fig. 2, tight inter-meeting ranges did not prevent sizable
meeting-to-meeting adjustments of the policy rate in 1973-74 and, consequently,
are an unlikely source of policy passivity.
Inconsistencies with real-time policy actions and discussions plague other
interpretations of the 1970s that attempt to find fault with explicit or implicit
constraints on policy rather than with the design of the intermediate targeting
policy itself. One interpretation of the 1970s is that the FOMC did not believe
it had popular support for large increases in the policy rate, vid. DeLong (1997)
and Meltzer (2005). This explanation is not consistent with policy actions in
mid-1974, when the funds rate was driven near 13%, nor with discussion in the
19Goldfeld (1976) indicates that a representative money demand model of the early 1970s generates larger prediction
errors, with an out-of-sample RMSE of 6.3 percentage points from 1974Q1 to 1975Q2.
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FOMC Memorandum of Discussion:
“Chairman Burns said he might offer his appraisal of the existing support
for current Federal Reserve policy. He agreed that support in Congress was
strong; he had been receiving almost no critical mail from that source. Of the
letters that reached his desk from individuals across the country, a majority
were still commendatory.” (MOD, 6/18/74, p.62).20
Another possible interpretation is that the FOMC may have become
disenchanted with intermediate targeting of the monetary aggregates in the
mid-1970s. The role of intermediate targets in operational policy was reviewed
in the Stage II report of the Subcommittee on the Directive (1976) distributed to
FOMC members in early 1976.21 The initial portion of this report reviewed a staff
proposal that the policy instrument, such as the funds rate or nonborrowed reserves,
directly target ultimate objectives, such as unemployment and inflation, relegating
the money supply to one of many potential indicators of unobserved movements in
ultimate objectives. However, the remainder of the report endorsed the two-stage
strategy of intermediate targeting with monetary aggregates. FOMC discussion
of this report in the 3/15/76 meeting supported a continuation of intermediate
targeting:
“Mr. Wallich added that if optimal control were applied to monetary
policy it would tend to focus attention on such ultimate objectives as full
employment and price stability. However, he had strongly endorsed the
Subcommittee’s recommendation that monetary policy continue to focus
primarily on intermediate objectives, rather than on ultimate objectives....In
further discussion individual members of the Subcommittee commented
on the reasons why they had not favored directly relating an operational
instrument, such as nonborrowed reserves or the federal funds rate, to ultimate
objectives. These reasons included the difficulty of linking instrumental
variables to ultimate objectives, both intuitively or through use of econometric
models; the problem of reaching an agreement on necessary tradeoffs among
20It might be noted that this, and similar real-time MOD quotes, differ considerably from the retrospective Per
Jacobsson Lecture, often cited by policy historians, where Burns (1979) suggests: “As the Federal Reserve, for
example, kept testing and probing the limits of its freedom to undernourish the inflation, it repeatedly evoked violent
criticism from both the Executive Branch and the Congress.”
21The Subcommittee was chaired by Governor Holland, with Governor Wallich, President Balles (Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco), and President Morris (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston) as members.
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ultimate objectives; and the complications created by the fact that monetary
policy was but one of many influences on the ultimate objectives.” (MOD,
3/15/76, p.16)
The FOMC Memorandum of Discussion (MOD) suggests several issues that
may have contributed to passive policy rate responses to nominal growth gaps.
One possibility is that the FOMC may been optimistic about interest rate
elasticities, selecting policy rate adjustments that were too small to reverse
predicted nominal growth gaps.22 In particular, two procedures could have led
to effective overstatement of interest rate effects:
In framing final voting choices, FOMC members were free to pick policy
rates from one Bluebook option and monetary target ranges from another option.
The problem of inconsistent choices from an “a-la-carte menu” was occasionally
addressed in Bluebook presentations.
“The blue book can be viewed as a menu of consistent targets....The
Committee is, of course, free to choose among the various objectives
presented, taking due account of the risks being run. There is the risk, for
instance, of choosing incompatible objectives. However, this risk has to be
weighed against the probability there will be errors in the staff’s estimates of
relationships likely to prevail among bank reserves, monetary aggregates, and
interest rates.” Axilrod, FOMC Economist (MOD, 11/20/72, p.43)
A more direct route to optimistic views of interest rate effects is that projections
of interest rates associated with alternative options were judgmentally adjusted by
senior staff. Especially after staff models began to overpredict M1 growth in the
mid-1970s, there appear to have been nontrivial downward judgmental adjustments
of interest rate changes associated with alternative money growth paths.
“Mr. Gramley said there was considerable uncertainty about the projections of
interest rates, which were among the most difficult variables to project. As
Committee members knew, the staff tended to make rather large judgmental
adjustments to the interest rate projections produced by the model. In the
latest projection,...the model had produced a short-term interest rate in the
fourth quarter of 1976 that was 2-3/4 percentage points above the staff’s
judgementally projected rate.” (MOD, 9/16/75, p.25)
22The full system interest rate elasticity of the money supply is necessarily greater than the interest rate elasticity of
nominal output if the interest rate elasticity of money demand is also negative.
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A second interpretation of the apparent passivity of policy is that increased
uncertainty about properties of empirical money demand functions after the
mid-1970s may have induced more cautious policy adjustments.
“Mr.Volcker said he felt rather strongly that the right approach to policy today
was to hold interest rates fairly steady....Mr. Axilrod’s remarks, which he
found stimulating and even persuasive, provided a further indication of how
little was known about the short-run relationship between interest rates and
the money supply.” (MOD, 11/18/75, p.39).23
Finally, a third conjecture concerning the framing of policy choices is that
differences in the underlying relationships and forecast horizons of the short-run
policy options of the Bluebook and of the multiperiod predictions of the Greenbook
may have made it difficult for FOMC deliberations to connect current policy
decisions to longer-run predicted outcomes.24
“Mr. MacLaury remarked that he was disturbed by what he perceived as a
lack of clarity in the Committee’s methodology. While the Committee now
was publicly announcing its longer-term targets, he has less confidence than
before in his understanding of the path by which these objectives were to
be achieved....it seemed strange for the blue book to state that all of the
three alternatives it presented were generally consistent with the 12-month
ranges. He believed it made a difference whether the Committee embarked
on the path indicated by the high alternative or on that indicated by the low
alternative.” (MOD, 5/20/75, p.59)
23
“The actual stock of money has been running well short of what either our quarterly or monthly money market
models would have predicted for some time, given actual GNP and interest rates....given uncertainties with respect to
the meaning of recent money supply behavior as well as still unresolved issues affecting the municipal market, the
committee may wish to consider giving somewhat more weight than usual to money market conditions in framing its
instructions.” Axilrod, FOMC Economist (MOD, 11/18/75, pp.33-5).
24Judgemental adjustments of interest rates associated with alternative policy options, discussed earlier, were
motivated not only by money demand forecast errors in the 1970s but also by differences among competing staff
models, such as the monthly money market model used in Bluebook analyses and quarterly models used for Greenbook
analyses. “Mr. Gramley replied that the staff’s interest rate projections depended on the relationship between growth in
money and growth in nominal GNP. Personal income was used only in the monthly model, because no better monthly
indicators of aggregate expenditures was available....Mr. Axilrod remarked that recent work done by the Board’s staff
indicated that in the first year of recovery interest rate projections based on nominal GNP were too high while those
based on personal income were too low. In making its interest rate projections for the blue book, the staff had taken
those results into account.” (MOD, 9/16/75, pp. 32-3) Consequently, it is not historically accurate to assume that all
judgemental forecast adjustments were confined to intercept adjustments. Kalchbrenner and Tinsley (1977) discuss
differences between policy use of auxiliary measurements and use of competing models.
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5 A contrast with 1970s monetary policy in Germany
Perhaps the deeper flaw of FOMC intermediate targeting in the 1970s is that
it obscured the ultimate objectives of policy by shifting the official gauge of
policy performance from inflation and economic activity to the growth rate of the
money supply. Thus, an additional shortcoming of US policy in the 1970s was to
underestimate the role of longer-run inflation expectations in influencing decisions
of the private sector.
This contrasts with Bundesbank policy in the 1970s, which published
medium-term objectives for inflation along with annual money growth targets,
Gerberding, Worms and Seitz (2004). As the Bundesbank missed its annual money
growth target ranges about half of the time, vid. Schmid (1999), it seems plausible
that the announced medium-term inflation goals were more useful references in
helping to anchor longer-run inflation expectations of the private sector.25
The Bundesbank inflation target and two indicators of long-run inflation in
Germany are shown in Fig. 4 for 1970-79. The inflation-based indicator of
long-run inflation is a fixed-gain estimate of the mean of German CPI inflation,
using π¯t = (1 − γ)π¯t−1 + γπt, where γ = 0.015.26 The bond rate indicator
provides a more direct measure of bond trader real-time perceptions of long-run
inflation where the indicator is the forward rate in the last year of the 10-year
government bond, less an adjustment for a constant term premium and real interest
rate, f10,t − θ.27
Similar to the upward movement of the perceived US inflation target shown
in Fig. 1, both indicators of long-run inflation for Germany in Fig. 4 rise in the
first half of the 1970s. But unlike the US experience, both indicators in Fig. 4
reverse course and track relatively closely the announced inflation target of the
Bundesbank in the last half of the 1970s. 28
A similar recognition of the important role of longer-run inflation expectations
25Associations between money supply targeting performance and inflation are tenuous. As noted earlier, the FOMC
satisfied the published M1 target ranges in two of the four years from 1975Q4-1979Q4 but missed published target
ranges throughout the disinflation of 1979Q4-1983Q4, Broaddus and Goodfriend (1984).
26As shown in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b), a monthly gain of γ = 0.015 provides a reasonable approximation of
survey estimates of US long-run inflation expectations.
27The constant, θ, is selected so the average of f10,t − θ equals the average long-run inflation of the ECB Survey of
Professional Forecasters in the available survey sample, 1999Q1-2009Q1.
28As documented in Gurkaynak et al. (2006), long forward rates appear to be better anchored with the announcement
of explicit inflation targets.
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in shaping agent decisions was a frequent theme in the testimony and speeches
of Volcker, following the October 1979 shift in policy. When defending the
continuation of restrictive monetary policy in the early 1980s, even after a sharp
fall in current inflation, Volcker noted that success would be achieved when
long-term interest rates signalled a decline in long-term inflation expectations.
“Nothing would please me more than for interest rates to decline....But, I also
know that it would be shortsighted for the Federal Reserve to abandon a
strong sense of discipline in monetary policy in an attempt to bring down
interest rates....When long-term interest rates decline decisively, it will be
an indication of an important change in attitudes about the prospects for
the economy. One essential element in this process must be a widespread
conviction that inflation will be contained in the long run.” Volcker (1982).29
6 Concluding remarks
Recent studies, including Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), indicate that dynamic
properties of empirical macro models are often more realistic if allowance is made
for differences in perceptions among private and public agents regarding the central
bank target for inflation. The current paper provides estimates of the effective
FOMC target for inflation implied by empirical policy response functions, where
the real-time conditioning information is based on Greenbook briefing forecasts
presented before FOMC meetings from the 1970s through the late-1990s.
In contrast to the assumption of a fixed central bank inflation target, the effective
inflation target constructions not only vary considerably over the sample but
are substantially different from available survey information on the long-horizon
inflation expectations of private sector agents.
Of two leading empirical interpretations of the Great Inflation, the “passive
policy” description of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) is perhaps the most
optimistic, as empirical analyses of historical U.S. monetary policy generally
indicate stable policy responses to inflation have been maintained since the 1980s.
The “natural rate error” description of Orphanides (2003, 2004) has a seductive
appeal for central banks for it suggests that unlucky mistakes were made, but
29Additional extracts from FOMC transcripts, supporting the view that Volcker and other members of the FOMC
after October 1979 referenced long-term bond rates as indicators of the level and uncertainty of private sector long-term
inflation expectations, are reproduced in Goodfriend and King (2005).
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carries also the pessimistic inference that these mistakes will likely occur in the
future. The empirical evidence presented in section 3 indicates that monetary
policy in the 1970s is better characterized by money growth intermediate targeting.
This implies that FOMC errors in estimating natural rate gaps for output or the
unemployment rate are largely irrelevant to explanations of the Great Inflation.
The empirical evidence in section 3 also supports the passive policy
interpretation, as adjustments of the U.S. central bank policy rate in the 1970s
were not sufficiently vigorous to result in stable responses to movements in
inflation.30 However, the passive policy interpretation is merely a description of
unstable policy, not an explanation. A description of 1970s FOMC policy based
on intermediate targeting of money supply growth offers a neglected search area
for explanations of passive policy responses, such as the optimistic estimates of
interest rate elasticities discussed in section 4.
Given the advantage of hindsight, there will always be mistakes in the execution
of monetary policy, including errors in estimating current values of conditional
equilibria or responses to policy instruments. An additional shortcoming of US
monetary policy in the 1970s, noted in section 5, was to neglect the potential for
publicly announced inflation targets to anchor the longer-run inflation expectations
of the private sector. Although money growth targets were published in both the
US and Germany in the second half of the 1970s, the Bundesbank also announced
longer-run inflation goals. Whereas indicators of long-run inflation in the US
continued to rise throughout the 1970s, indicators of long-run inflation in Germany
reversed direction and closely tracked the Bundesbank inflation objective.
The relative inefficiencies of money growth intermediate targeting have been
documented at length elsewhere, such as Rudebusch and Svensson (2002).
Obviously, it does not diminish notable contributions of monetarism to the
design of postwar monetary policy to acknowledge a causal role for money
growth intermediate targeting during the Great Inflation of the U.S. Historical
documentation in this paper supports the assessment of Milton Friedman (2006):
“The use of the quantity of money as a target has not been a success.”
30Kozicki and Tinsley (2008) indicate passive policy rate responses to inflation may not be sufficient to rule out
determinate inflation and present evidence that US bond rates had elastic responses to inflation in the 1970s.
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Table 1
Unpublished FOMC targets for M1 growth, 1970-1975
FOMC date target (%) FOMC date target (%)
2/10/70 70Q1 4.0 1/16/73 73Q1-Q2 5.0-6.0
3/10/70 70Q2 3.0 2/13/73 73Q1-Q2 5.0-6.0
4/7/70 70Q2 3.0 3/20/73 73Q2-Q3 5.0-5.5
5/05/70 70Q2 4.0 4/17/73 73Q2-Q3 5.25
5/26/70 70Q2 4.0 5/15/73 73Q2-Q3 5.0-5.5
6/23/70 70Q3 4.0 6/19/73 73Q3-Q4 4.5
7/21/70 70Q3 5.0 7/17/73 74Q3-Q4 3.75
8/18/70 70Q4 5.0 8/21/73 73Q3-Q4 3.75
9/15/70 70Q4 5.0 9/18/73 73Q4-74Q1 4.5
10/10/70 70Q4 5.0 10/16/73 73Q4-74Q1 5.0
11/17/70 70Q4 4.0; 71Q1 6.0 11/20/73 73Q4-74Q1 5.0
12/15/70 71Q1 6.0 12/18/73 74Q1-Q2 5.25
1/10/71 71Q1 7.5 1/22/74 74Q1-Q2 5.75
2/9/71 71Q1 6 2/10/74 74Q1-Q2 5.75
3/9/71 71Q2 9.5 3/19/74 74Q2-Q3 5.25
4/6/71 71Q2 8.0 4/16/74 74Q2-Q3 5.5
5/11/71 71Q2 8.5; 71Q3 7.5 5/21/74 74Q2-Q3 5.5
6/8/71 71Q3 9.5 6/18/74 74Q3-Q4 5.25
6/29/71 71Q3 9.0 7/16/74 74Q3-Q4 5.25
7/27/71 71Q3 9.0; 71Q4 4.0 8/20/74 74Q3-Q4 5.25
8/24/71 71Q3 8.0; 71Q4 3.0 9/10/74 74Q4-75Q1 5.75
9/21/71 71Q4 3.5-4.5; 71Q3-Q4 4.0-4.5 10/15/74 74Sept-75Jun 5.75
10/19/71 71Q4 2.5; 72Q1 4.5 11/19/74 74Sept-75Jun 5.75
11/16/71 71Q4 0.0; 72Q1 6.0 12/17/74 74Dec-75Jun 6.0
12/14/71 72Q1 7.0
1/10/72 72Q1 7-8 1/21/75 75Q1-Q2 6.0
2/15/72 72Q1 7-8 2/19/75 74Dec-75Jun 4.5
3/21/72 72Q2 7.5 74Dec-75Sept 6.0
4/17/72 72Q2 7.25 74Jun-75Jun 3.75
5/23/72 72Q2 7.25; 72Q3 6.5 3/18/75 74Dec-75Jun 4.5
6/19/72 72Q3 6.5 74Dec-75Sept 6.0
7/18/72 72Q3 6.5 74Jun-75Jun 3.75
8/15/72 72Q4 7.5; 72Q4-73Q1 6.7 4/15/75 75Mar-76Mar 5.0-7.5
9/19/72 72Q4 7.5; 73Q1 6.5
10/17/72 72Q4-73Q1 6.0
11/21/72 72Q4-73Q1 6.0
12/19/72 73Q1-Q2 5.0-6.0
Sources: FOMC Memorandum of Discussion and Bluebook. Published targets began in May 1975.
Table 2
Subscript notation and examples
item notation comment
FOMC meeting date tf within quarter t
Greenbook (GB) date tg within quarter t, prior to tf
Federal funds rate rtf meeting-to-meeting average, from tf to tf + 1
GB forecast of variable zt zt|tg forecast in tg of z in current quarter t
GB forecast of variable zt+1 zt+1|tg forecast in tg of z in next quarter of forecast horizon
Table 3
Federal funds rate policy rule: Burns/Miller and Volcker/Greenspan samples
r∗tf = ρ¯t + π¯t + c2,t(π
4
t+1|tg − π¯t) + c3,t(ut+1|tg − u¯t) + c4,t∆ut|tg ,
rtf = (1− β6,t)r
∗
tf
+ β5,t∆rtf−1 + β6,trtf−1 + atf ,
= β1,t + β2,tπ
4
t+1|tg + β3,t(ut+1|tg − u¯t) + β4,t∆ut|tg + β5,t∆rtf−1 + β6,t(rtf−1 − ρ¯t) + ρ¯t + atf ,
π¯t = −β1,t/(β2,t + β6,t − 1).
tvp format estimated β¯i estimated π¯t
Burns/Miller sample: 1970Q1-1979Q2
β¯1 β¯2 β¯3 β¯4 β¯5 β¯6 min max
RWI mean coeff .025 .116 -.067 -.229 .532 .893 -3.7 -0.1
p-value [.60] [.01] [.09] [.03] [.00] [.00]
SC mean coeff .017 .120 -.066 -.242 .523 .891 -9.0 1.1
p-value [.90] [.01] [.11] [.03] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 17 42 1 0 0 40
Volcker/Greenspan sample: 1979Q3-1997Q4
β¯1 β¯2 β¯3 β¯4 β¯5 β¯6 min max
RWI mean coeff -.159 .222 -.073 -.296 .364 .833 2.2 3.5
p-value [.05] [.00] [.01] [.01] [.00] [.00]
SC mean coeff -.154 .229 -.066 -.286 .406 .819 3.1 3.4
p-value [.20] [.02] [.03] [.09] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 5 58 0 0 0 37
rtf denotes the average funds rate from the FOMC meeting tf , within quarter t, to the next FOMC
meeting; π4t+1|tg is 4-quarter inflation and ut+1|tg − u¯t is the unemployment deviation from the
unemployment natural rate, drawn from the multiperiod Greenbook (GB) forecast tg, prior to
FOMC meeting tf . Estimates of GB natural rates, u¯t, are discussed in Kozicki and Tinsley (2006).
As noted in text, the time-varying coefficient specifications are random walk intercept (RWI) and
stationary coefficients (SC).
Table 4
Federal funds rate policy rule Burns/Miller sample: money growth targeting
r∗tf = ρ¯t + π¯t + c2,t∆xt+1|tg + c3,t(ut+1|tg − u¯t) + c4,t∆u
4
t+1|tg ,
∆xt+1|tg = π
4
t+1|tg − π¯t − a
′∆u4t+1|tg ,
rtf = (1− β6,t)r
∗
tf
+ β5,t∆rtf−1 + β6,trtf−1 + atf ,
= β1,t + β2,t∆xt+1|tg + β3,t(ut+1|tg − u¯t) + β4,t∆u
4
t+1|tg + β5,t∆rtf−1
+β6,t(rtf−1 − ρ¯t) + ρ¯t + atf ,
π¯t = −β1,t/(β2,t + β6,t − 1).
tvp format estimated β¯i estimated π¯t
β¯1 β¯2 β¯3 β¯4 β¯5 β¯6 min max
RWI mean coeff .156 .037 -.008 .518 .942 6.3 7.5
p-value [.00] [.03] [.80] [.00] [.00]
SC mean coeff .149 .040 -.009 .509 .940 6.8 7.8
p-value [.21] [.02] [.78] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 30 11 2 0 56
RWI mean coeff .024 .093 .114 .557 .906 9.4 27.1
p-value [.61] [.02] [.12] [.00] [.00]
SC mean coeff .037 .092 .114 .545 .904 7.4 118
p-value [.78] [.02] [.13] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 16 33 0 0 51
RWI mean coeff .146 .037 .523 .941 6.1 7.1
p-value [.00] [.03] [.00] [.00]
SC mean coeff .142 .038 .515 .940 6.5 7.2
p-value [.21] [.02] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 32 10 0 58
Sample 1970Q1-1979Q2; rtf denotes the average federal funds rate from FOMC meeting tf , within
quarter t, to the next FOMC meeting; π4t+1|tg and ∆u
4
t+1|tg
are 4-quarter GB forecasts from the
multiperiod GB forecast tg, prior to FOMC meeting tf . The Okun’s Law assumption, a′ = 2.2, is
drawn from Tatom (1978). As noted in text, the time-varying coefficient specifications are random
walk intercept (RWI) and stationary coefficients (SC).
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Fig. 1. Historical and perceived FOMC inflation targets, 1970-1997. The “effective targets”
are implied by stationary coefficient (SC) specifications, from the bottom panel of Table 4 for
Burns/Miller sample and bottom panel of Table 3 for Volker/Greenspan sample. The “perceived
target” denotes private sector perceptions from Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a); “survey” denotes the
Hoey survey of 5-10 year expected inflation; and “HP” denotes a Hodrick-Prescott filter of real-time
inflation.
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Fig. 2. Federal funds rate and FOMC tolerance ranges, Burns/Miller tenures.
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Fig. 3. Federal funds rate and the predicted nominal growth proxy, Burns/Miller tenures. The
proxy for 4-quarter growth rates of nominal GDP is based on Greenbook predictions of inflation
and unemployment and defined by ∆xt+1|tg in Table 4.
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Fig. 4. Bundesbank inflation target and long-term inflation indicators, 1970m1-1979m12. The
inflation target is from Gerberding et al. (2004). The inflation-based indicator of long-term inflation
is a fixed-gain estimate of mean German CPI inflation, using a monthly gain of 0.015. The bond
rate indicator of long-term inflation is the forward rate in the last year of the government 10-year
bond, adjusted for a constant real interest rate and term premium, as discussed in the text.
